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Abstract
This paper develops a simple self-selection utility model for leaving a neighbor-
hood. This opens the door for a simple reduced form approach that leverages a
hierarchical Bayesian model to obtain an annualized latent push and pull fac-
tor for each neighborhood. Posterior analysis indicates that common predictors
of neighborhood quality and inputs to classical utility functions systematically
under-predict the number of people who stay in a neighborhood. Such under-
prediction of out-migration can either be viewed as an unexplained variation
due to neighborhood “loyalty” or as financial barriers to mobility. I isolate this
residual, referred to as an “inertia,” isolated using a quasi-experimental match-
ing method that uses variation in push factor to isolate effects on pull factors.
I show the inertia measure can be explained by measures of financial access
including distance to a bank branch, local rates of second mortgage, and rede-
velopment certifications. The residual from these financial measures is shown to
correlate with existence of anchor institutions like charter schools. This method-
ology creates a robust measure of not only the local push- and pull-factors by
neighborhood, but also is suggestive of an economic approach to appraising local
community strength.
1
1 Introduction
Residents move out of neighborhoods when they find new jobs, find better hous-
ing or schools, or seek a change in their built environment. Put in other terms,
the decision to leave the current neighborhood hinges on the neighborhood no
longer serving a demand or need for a particular amenity, given its cost of liv-
ing. Residents of a neighborhood value the amenities provided by their neighbor-
hood, such as employment access, public goods, or structural access to consump-
tion goods. However, different residents value different amenities with varying
importances, and these relative amenity values can further vary over time. To
the experimenter looking at economic data, a resident only reveals their pref-
erences for individual amenities when they enter or leave a neighborhood. We
cannot observe their taste for individual components of a neighborhood, but
when they choose to leave a neighborhood, we know they wanted a different
of a given component for the same cost. This is the logic of the neighborhood
choice model.
While neighborhood choice has been a key asset to the amenity valuation lit-
erature, the process of leaving neighborhoods is perhaps less consistently used
for this purpose, though its logic is relatively similar. I demonstrate that a
Bayesian survival analysis approach to residential out-migration can be used to
estimate demand for amenities. I also demonstrate that such models tend to
under-predict the frequency of high-retention neighborhoods - in other words,
some residents appear to stay in neighborhoods despite a measurably under-
performing basket of amenities given local cost of living. I investigate two
possible reasons for what I will refer to as residential inertia.
The first source of inertia is a fixed cost. Leaving a neighborhood involves a
large financial shift: accruing the resources to conduct repairs to make a house
marketable, acquiring resources to market the home, finding a buyer, finding a
new home and gainful employment in a new neighborhood, and the finances for
a new down payment. Even renters face a cost of search and movement, as well
as potential fees associated with early lease termination or unpaid collections.
The complex set of costs creates a cost of geographic mobility that can change
the resettlement calculus. This cost of resettlement can be restrictive, especially
when trying to leave neighborhoods whose land values have fallen during the
time of residency. Such a combination of forces creates a financial quagmire
which can trap of individuals in neighborhoods whose amenities are functioning
below most measures of market clearing rates. These fixed costs pose problems
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for econometricians, as they are difficult to measure without targeted data, and
often vary with neighborhood due to spatial variation in access to local credit
(Tranfaglia, 2018) and faith in credit institutions. (Blanchflower et al., 2003)
The second source of inertia is community. Some residents might choose to
stay in an otherwise under-performing neighborhood because there are strong
community effects in place. Moving would require high start-up costs for getting
such a community in a new location, and this diminishes the potential utility of
new neighborhoods.
This paper will investigate geographic mobility by modeling the underlying
decision to move out of a neighborhood. While neighborhood choice models tend
to be expensive, I use a machine learning approach that learns latent “push”
and “pull” factors of neighborhoods, parameters that describe a neighborhood’s
opportunity cost and amenity value, respectively. By using when residents leave
a neighborhood, I construct a distribution of these possible push and pull fac-
tors for the population of residents. Based on these factors, I can then construct
elasticities of demand with respect to time-varying amenities and time-varying
prices. The model is demonstrated to over-predict out-migration from neighbor-
hoods, which I argue is due to a residential inertia factor. In other words, people
stay in neighborhoods that do not provide rational benefit for their relative cost.
2 Literature
2.1 Neighborhood Choice
A number of studies have looked at the neighborhood as a basket of goods in the
past. Most common is the tendency to study neighborhood choice as a discrete
choice experiment; the new resident has a set of different baskets to choose
from, and must choose one. Such a framework allows the economist to extract a
willingness to pay for different amenities using the basic principles of a dynamic
model. (Bayer et al., 2016) The underlying variation in amenities serves as
a de facto natural experiment for the economist, with neighborhood selection
revealing preference of the consumer for what amenities have a higher value.
Others use more traditional hedonic models for a similar purpose, but these
models have come under scrutiny for being far too subject to sample choice,
especially without motivating structural justifications. (Huang et al., 2014) In
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the most basic structural models, individuals choose community j to maximize
max
j
V (α, gj , pj , y)
where the inputs are a taste parameter, a congestable public good, housing price,
and income in this order. Notice that such inputs are distributional variables;
the value function framework naturally translates into a Bayesian construction.
A good deal of work on the analogue, the Dirichlet model for multi-modal choice,
has been conducted by economists studying conjoint analysis methods for re-
vealed preference. (Louviere, 2008)(Morikawa et al., 2002)
Structural estimation, of course, requires significant overhead in terms of
data required and specification of the statistical model Equilibrium existence is
difficult to prove deterministically for situations which add particularly complex
upgrades to the basic specification of the value function. The nested fixed-point
algorithm is most often used to solve for a particular maximization problem.
Such a dynamic programming approach can thus be expensive, and partial so-
lution approaches are idiosyncratic and application-specific.
Regardless, significant strides have been made in developing fairly robust
forms of these models. Patrick Bayer and Fernando Ferreira in particular have
used classic value function iteration methodology to tackle high-risk lendings
impact on racial lines in mortgage rates. (Bayer et al., 2017) Bayer also devel-
oped a dynamic model earlier on which flexibly calculated marginal willingness
to pay for various amenities in an expansive dataset from San Francisco which
has since led to a number of augmentations and applications to other regions of
the country. (Bayer et al., 2016) Recently, a working paper identifying central
neighborhood change in cities developed a modification of the framework to look
at a specific piece of the American city over time. (Baum-Snow and Hartley,
2017) Research on housing vouchers has been an important policy area in which
this econometric methodology has made recent headway. (Davis et al., 2017)
2.2 Stability in Local Income Distributions
Throughout this work, Lee and Lin (2017) serves as one of several key references
because it explicitly tracks the relative stability of a neighborhood’s income
distribution. Lee & Lin tie part of the variation in income distribution stability
to natural amenities. They define an endogenous aggregate amenity level A as:
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Aj,t ≡ αj + E(θ|j, t) +mt + εj,t (1)
αj is the persistent natural amenity value of neighborhood j (across periods).
Then, E(θ|j, t) is the average income of neighborhood j in period j - meant to
capture amenities like school quality which tend to correlate with income. mt
captures trends in city-level amenities shared across neighborhoods. The key
to the model in Lin’s paper, and the focus of the model in this paper, is εj,t.
This is the idiosyncratic amenity shock term, corresponding to natural disas-
ters and governance changes in Lin’s paper. The Lee and Lin (2017) paper
develops equilibrium conditions and structurally parametrizes neighborhoods
which change income-distribution rankings across periods. The paper’s key re-
sult is that naturally heterogeneous cities have persistent spatial distributions
of income, where persistence can be measured as the expected variance of an
neighborhood’s income percentile rank: E[Var(rj,t|j)].
A larger discussion exists around neighborhoods which experience a persistent
level of income inequality. Benabou (2000) argues in the optimal case such a
feature of the economy at its core violates a notion of social justice via the social
contract. This discussion largely began with the work of Durlauf in his 1996
paper, which develops persistent income inequality as an artifact of the persis-
tence of income within families. (Durlauf, 1996) This is the obvious candidate;
transmission of wealth underpins intergenerational transmission of income char-
acteristics. Barakova et al. (2003) found that credit was indeed an important
factor in the tenureship decision. Important also is whether that wealth stays
in one place, this being the subject of the current paper.
2.3 Geographic Mobility
Geographic mobility has not been heavily studied amongst economists but bears
important relevance to how well current models apply to path-dependent hous-
ing markets. Other sources of path dependence have been explored (Bleakley
and Lin, 2012), though the mobility path is less explicitly explored. For ex-
ample, recent work has explored down payments as a key mechanism which
stymies homeownership of new homeowners. The out-migration pathway is less
explicitly explored. (Stein, 1995)
Famous studies of mobility tend to be on the front of employment or intergener-
ational socioeconomic mobility. (Chetty et al., 2014) (Chetty et al., 2017) This
paper observes the intra-generational mobility problem; fundamentally, we ask:
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If people live in a place that limits their economic potential, can they leave it?
Compare this to the conventional economic picture of intergenerational income
mobility; the two are fundamentally different processes but also fundamentally
linked. Evidence exists that economic mobility is tied to spatial features. For
example, urban sprawl seems to correlate with lower rates of urban mobility,
attributed significantly to ease of job accessibility. (Ewing et al., 2016) Then,
leaving a neighborhood from which employment is inaccessible is a fundamental
functional necessity in the economic mobility puzzle. Individuals in bottom-
quartile neighborhoods are estimated to be able to earn over $600,000 more
in lifetime wages if raised in top-quartile neighborhoods, so that neighborhood
income has roughly half the effect on future earnings as parental income. (Roth-
well and Massey, 2015) With such a large economic impetus to move, the reasons
why individuals cannot move, tied to affordability of other neighborhoods or the
cost of leaving one’s own neighborhood along various dimensions, is a relevant
economic question. For example, often, once an individual has made the deci-
sion to move, other neighborhoods which are affordable may exist, but outside
the city. Costs of re-establishing community, social networks, job connections,
childhood schooling relationships, and more can quickly daunt potential movers.
(Durlauf, 1993) (Brock and Durlauf, 2001) (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004)
(Benabou, 1996)
2.4 Probabilistic Approaches
The analysis in this paper aligns with a growing literature on probabilistic ap-
proaches to neighborhood choice analysis. There are several chief reasons for
such a methodology. The data most available and most widely available to
policymakers consists of aggregates at particular levels, making either a Hier-
archical Bayesian aggregate approach or an agent-based approach attractive.
Individuals across fields recognize the value of probabilistic approaches for con-
joint analysis (Halme and Kallio, 2014) and for understanding nonstationary
processes. (Fader and Lattin, 1993)
Recent work has pinpointed gentrification as a fairly nonstationary process over-
all, described as a timing problem on a neighborhood. Such timing processes
difficult for the dynamic programming model, as they require significant over-
head to parametrize precisely. (Hwang and Lin, 2016) (Lin et al., 2017) Gentri-
fication and disinvestment are functions of consumer tastes and shifts in market
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tendencies which may be better captured by hierarchical distributions than de-
terministic settings. Urban revival mandates across cities have also presented
a policy-level need for more sophisticated modeling of how neighborhood taste
drifts over time. (Couture and Handbury, 2017)
The Bayesian approach has gained currency in other fields of economics as a form
of a discrete choice model which, though perhaps less able to discern between
supply-side and demand-side effects in its current form, is perhaps better able to
capture distribution-level drift. (Athey et al., 2017a) (Athey et al., 2017b) Some
work has looked at housing markets with similar approaches. (Walls et al., 2018)
(Royall, 2016) One recent work which uses a stochastic approach to identifying
equilibria has tackled how changing consumer information affects the Tiebout
hypothesis. Jehiel and Lamy (2018) The Athey et al. (2017a) specification uses
a multidimensional prior for a value function that resembles a conjoint analy-
sis utility function for consumer products. Jehiel and Lamy (2018) opts for a
more complex period-over-period updating prior which embeds certain Markov
assumptions in the utility function, somewhat akin to a hidden Markov Model
(HMM).
3 Methodology
This paper models the survival function as an outcome variable of a demand
process. In other words, individuals each have a value function maxj U(j) that
determines their optimal neighborhood choice among neighborhoods j ∈ N.
They choose to leave their current neighborhood when that value function is no
longer optimized in their current neighborhood. This produces a neighborhood-
level survival function Sj(t) that aggregates the various lifetimes of all of the
individuals in neighborhood j. Assume all of these decisions are according
continuous time functions, which are observable in discrete time intervals (in
our case, annually).
3.1 Hazard-Setting Game
Residents i of a given neighborhood j experience three forms of goods: ameni-
ties (public and private), housing goods (bedrooms, bathrooms, backyards, etc.),
and access to local structural resources (e.g., employment opportunities, healthy
food access, local bank branches, distance to central business district opportuni-
ties, etc.). As these values evolve after the period T in which the resident moves
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in, individuals derive some utility according to an arbitrary function of the three
goods and the local price level for each. This function is assumed to have the
same functional form across individuals, but the form itself is unknown. Indi-
vidual parameters of the value function, such as elasticity to various observable
goods provided by the neighborhood, are heterogeneous across individuals.
Local policy decisions, changes in local employment markets, and city-level de-
mographic shifts cause fluctuation in each of the goods over time. Thus, the
goods value of a neighborhood is time-varying. Then, we can define a “local
component” of the value function of the individual that is totally contributed
by local features to the individual’s neighborhood. If UNijT corresponds same in-
dividual utility function but is entirely calculated via the relative value of local
variables and parameters:
UNijT = U
N
ijT (AjT , ηjT ,ΠjT , PjT , djT , hjT ) (2)
Terms correspond to relative values of goods: local amenities, employment
access, and housing, and the costs thereof. By relative, we mean that the
entire universe of neighborhoods is ranked relatively on these features and the
resulting relative weights of each neighborhood is used to calculate the above
function. Individuals leave when the utility of local goods is no longer justified
by the cost. Note that individuals place varying weight on varying amenities
and housing goods. This is captured by allowing varying utility assignments
to {Ajt, ηjt,Πjt}, which represent latent variables that aggregate the relative
values of objective measures of local state variables.
Assumption 1.
Individuals know own-neighborhood latent aggregated state variables with suf-
ficient accuracy.
With this in mind, we argue individuals, in a world with perfect mobility (an
assumption which is relaxed later), will choose to move out when a benchmark,
or “market-clearing” utility is breached. Continuing the language of relative
weights, if each neighborhood has some total positive local-utility function to the
individual of U+ijt that comes at some cost U
−
ijt - which includes the opportunity
cost of the next best neighborhood, then the individual moves when
Ūij = U
+
ijt − U
−
ijt < 0 (3)
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Using this threshold framework, I focus my analysis on learning the distri-
bution of U+ijt and U
−
ijt across all individuals by neighborhood to create distri-
butions, U+jt and U
−
jt . These are dimensionless “push” and “pull” factor distri-
butions, the latent aggregated variables governing the decision to move out of a
neighborhood. Individuals experience a push and pull factor drawn from these
aggregated distributions in a given period, making their decision to churn based
on these parameters. This approach leverages self-selection; residents select
themselves to move out of a neighborhood based on these parameters, revealing
their preference for the current neighborhood. A comparison in the literature
is the Roy Framework used by labor economists to model the decision to enter
the labor market and leave home production. (Heckman and Honore, 1990)
This problem lends itself well to a Hierarchical Bayesian model when aggre-
gated to neighborhood-level distributions. We do not know the absolute sur-
vival function of a neighborhood. But, census data provides annual histograms
of out-migration by income. By estimating a two-parameter distribution that
describes out-migration frequency by income, we have an estimated Sj(t) for
that period. This is the outcome variable. We can also attempt to fit an error
model to the margins of error that are associated with this histogram estimation
procedure; this topic is left for a later date, but can provide added robustness
to the machine learning procedure when included a priori.
In particular, if the aggregate income distribution of neighborhood j in pe-
riod t is denoted Yjt, but it is Yj,t+1 in period t + 1, then the out-migrant
population ∆j,t+1 = Yj,t+1 −Mjt − Yjt (with Mjt the income distribution of
new migrants in this time-frame) had consumed at or below a clearing-price
utility Ūij while the survivors consumed at or above this utility. This absolute
binary is used to adjust a measure of the relative push and pull factor distribu-
tions of the neighborhood.
At a given time, the change distribution ∆j,t+1 indicates that U
+
ij −U
−
ij < 0 for
i ∈ ∆j,t+1 and U+ij − U
−
ij ≥ 0 for i /∈ ∆j,t+1. We update our distribution of be-
liefs about U±jt each period based on this data. What this exercise demonstrates
is that any two-parameter distribution F with parameters that are levers for
increasing or decreasing the likelihood of the outcome - correspond to U±ij - can
be used to model the heterogeneity in push/pull factor balance, Ujt = U
+
jt−U
−
jt .
In particular, this suggests a beta-distributed model of behavior. Because we
have a single outcome variable, the outcome distribution is singular, but the use
of the beta implies that the hyperpriors for the two parameters, α and β, should
mirror the maximum likelihood distributions of U+jt and U
−
jt , respectively. If
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every individual experiences the same utility function Uijt, then the survival
function would necessarily be an entire upheaval or an entirely stable neighbor-
hood. If, however, individuals consume at variable rates of substitution, then
we can construct a survival distribution across individuals. Let the probability
that individual i leaves and that their value function Ujt < 0 conditional on
income is given by the parameter θi. Then, individual hazards are
hi(t) = f(θit|yi) = P{θit|αjt, βjt}P{αjt, βjt|yi} (4)
where f(·) is the Bernoulli trial corresponding to the probability of moving
out. Integrating across individuals,
∫
Nj
hi(t)dt = Sj(t) = F (Θjt|yi) = P{Θjt|αjt, βjt}P{αjt, βjt|∆jt} (5)
Keeping the structure of the hazard function simple is important for inter-
pretation of the model output, so this paper will focus entirely on Beta-Binomial
data generating processes (geometric and Weibull hazards were also considered,
but dynamics are difficult to address with histogram data. See 3.6).
This structure implies that neighborhood-level push and pull factors are en-
tirely identified if we know ∆jt. The next sections conduct a posterior analysis
of the learned structural parameters (α, β) and uses them to extract elasticities
to various amenities, as well as a measure of residential inertia.
3.2 Two-Geography Case
Suppose residents are choosing between two different neighborhoods, North
Philadelphia N and South Philadelphia S. Consider a simple logit model to
begin. Residents choose to maximize a utility with respect to geography j:
uijt = ~µAjt − γPjt + τt + fj + (1/ρ)εijt (6)
They derive this utility by comparing time-varying amenities Ajt of the
neighborhood (as well as some fixed effects for neighborhood fj which may
correspond to persistent amenities over time and time-specific adjustments cor-
responding to exogenous area-level shocks τt) to the price they pay to live in the
neighborhood Pjt. In the language of the above framework, U
+
ij = ~µAjt+τt+fj
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and U−ij = γPjt. They have some vector of preferences for various amenities
which defines their response to local conditions. For now, all local pull variables
are considered to be a piece of Ajt, though these are disaggregated in subsequent
sections. Allow ρ to represent the precision of unobserved preferences (i.e., 1/ρ
is the logit scale parameter). We for now will assume no exogenous term τt,
Individuals stay in the neighborhood with probabilities:
PN =
exp(~µANtρ− γPNtρ+ fNρ)
exp(~µANtρ− γPNtρ+ fNρ) + exp(~βAStρ− γPStρ+ fSρ)
(7)
PS =
exp(~µAStρ− γPStρ+ fSρ)
exp(~µANtρ− γPNtρ+ fNρ) + exp(~µAStρ− γPStρ+ fSρ)
(8)
The resulting model suggests that a high value of ρ suggests high hetero-
geneity which will lead to high sensitivity to amenities, whereas a low value of
ρ implies little impact of unobserved heterogeneity and thus a low sensitivity to
changes in amenity. Individuals leave with these strictly positive probabilities.
However, the model lacks identification of a vector ~β and therefore we cannot
necessarily make any causal claims around utility.
In the framework we introduce above, however, we develop a beta-geometric
probability of leaving the neighborhood. This model suggests that rather than
the above logit, in a single period case we have
1− PN (∆N ) =
B(αN + 1,∆N + βN − 1)
B(αN , βN )
(9)
1− PS(∆S) =
B(αS + 1,∆S + βS − 1)
B(αS , βS)
(10)
This system develops two descriptive parameters for each neighborhood,
αj and βj . The expected probability of leaving a neighborhood is given by
E(βj/αj). Why is this better? Because we can isolate from these two reduced
form parameters distinct components of variation. The proportion of hetero-
geneity corresponding to individual heterogeneity in this model is:
Σj =
Var(βj/α
3
j )
Ej(β/α3)
(11)
The remainder of the variation can be explained by structural parameters.
Then, by estimating first these push and pull parameters and controlling for
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individual-level preferences, we can estimate the structural response to a set of
time-varying amenities on these reduced form parameters. Consider the two
city case. If we obtain a maximum likelihood estimate of the two regions, we
obtain a heterogeneity-adjusted measure from:
α̂N = ΣNαN
α̂S = ΣSαS
and analogously for β.
The suggestive value function for this new model is then (scaling for money
metric utility),
Vj = log(exp(βj)− exp(αj))
The simplicity of the value function is suggestive of a simple resulting elastic-
ity estimation, obtained by ans application of the envelope theorem. I continue
this after generalizing the two-geography case. In the rest of the paper, for
convenience, we will drop the hat notation. Below, I discuss how the model
developed here allows for the creation of a histogram-level analysis, a technique
which enables Census data to generate valuable insights. I then discuss how we
can use the reduced-form estimates to obtain a robust estimator of the elasticity
of the neighborhood’s geographic mobility to a particular amenity.
3.3 From Histogram to Parameters
Neighborhoods have a survival histogram (alternatively in the planning litera-
ture, a tenureship histogram) which describes the number of individuals who
currently reside in the neighborhood and have been there for d years, for a range
of values 0 < d ≤ T . There exists some mean duration d̄j across residents in
neighborhood j.
Individuals each have some latent calculated utility of residency, Uit ∼ θit
in each period. In other words, the beta-geometric is a projection of money-
metric calculated utility from the real line to the unit interval. Values be-
low 0.5 correspond to a negative utility, U+it < U
−
it . Individuals are more
likely to leave the deeper negative their utility goes. Across the population,
this θit is distributed according to some distribution that generates the uncon-
ditional histogram (binned density function) of survival Sj,t for time frames
12
D = {0 ≤ d < d1, d1 ≤ d < d2, . . . , dK−1 ≤ d < dK}.
Then, using the data generating process above, individuals have lower θit
with a likelihood to a time- and neighborhood-specific pull factor βjt, and a
higher θit with the push factor αjt. The push factors form a sort of “shadow
price” of residency and the pull factors are in turn a utility of staying. These
values should be distributed according to the population-level distribution of
log(UNjt )
+, or the logarithm of the positive piece of an individual’s neighbor-
hood “basket of goods” value function, and log(UNjt )
−, respectively. The reason
for the logarithm is to give a convenient form to the mean of the mean churn.
The mean probability that a resident chooses to leave the neighborhood
corresponds to the balance between these two factors. The mean likelihood
should be the expected value of utility, or E((UNjt )
+ − (UNjt )−). Without loss
of generality, one can logarithmically transform utility so this likelihood is
E log((UNjt )
+ − (UNjt )−). Concavity of the logarithm implies this quantity is
strictly above log(E(UNjt )
+) − log(E(UNjt )−) =
logE(UNjt )
+
logE(UNjt )
− . Then, a reasonable
expression of the mean likelihood to leave the neighborhood comprises a ratio
of the push and pull factor, defined to abstract away the logarithmic algebra:
E(θit) =
βjt
αjt
. In other words, the mean of the empirical histogram Sj,t should
provide an estimator of the ratio of the push and pull factor of the neighbor-
hood. A higher mean implies either a higher pull or lower pull factor - which
stands to reason.
The model uses this logic to generate a hierarchical model using a histogram
of survivals rather than explicit microdata. Provided an uninformative prior for
αjt and βjt which assumes uniform positive and negative utility across the pop-
ulation, a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) estimator then calculates the
theoretical likelihood of obtaining Sj,t given these distributions for αjt and βjt.
Note that the maximum likelihood estimate generally aligns with a method-of-
moments approach, but the use of histogram data prevents reliable estimation
of a variance measure. Therefore, testing the likelihood of the full distribu-
tion Sj,t is a more stable empirical procedure for estimating αjt and βjt. In
other words, rather than estimating moments, the maximum-likelihood esti-
mate (which requires MCMC estimation for this hierarchical setting) maximizes
NjtP{dk−1 ≤ d < dk} = Sj,t(k), k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} - the theoretical likelihood of
the histogram itself.
Then, in summary, our procedure is:
1. For each neighborhood, calculate the out-migration population histogram
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for each year, ∆jt, where the histogram is along an axis of resident dura-
tion time described as D above.
2. Use MCMC estimation to find the posterior likelihood for αj and βj based
on the sequence histogram∆jT . The mean duration βj/αj corresponds to
the mean ED(∆jt). Label these values αjT and βjT .
3. Repeat the procedure for each histogram in the series, {∆j1, · · · ,∆j,T−1}.
Label these values αjt and βjt by time period.
4. Calculate the estimated standard error of β/α3 in each year across neigh-
borhoods, as well as the true E(β/α3) given the MCMC likelihood. The
ratio between these gives the distribution of Σjt.
5. Perform a correction which removes the portion of βjt and αjt which is
not explained by variation in composition of neighborhoods so that the
remaining values are precisely those attributable to structural differences
between neighborhoods, rather than individual preferences.
With this calibration technique in place, I now describe how we can obtain
identifiable elasticities.
3.4 Elasticity Estimation
The benefit of a hierarchical Bayesian model is the ability to minimize shape
assumptions of the utility model. Because we use a histogrammed dataset,
having the model be responsive to sampling variation is extremely important.
Begin with the push-side. Propose the following form for the latent push factor,
αjt, based on a mixed proportional hazards-type model:
αjt = H(aj + γ1P
−
jt + γ2σjt + τtt+ ε
(α)
jt ) (12)
where the components correspond to: a latent baseline (pulled from some un-
informative prior, say a uniform distribution), a simple linear term in relative
housing prices in this neighborhood, the same in the deviation of the local in-
come distribution, a time-specific term to capture taste shocks, and an idiosyn-
cratic shock. The negative superscript on the housing price latent variable refers
is the difference between objective market assessments of a hedonic house price
and actual annual sale prices from a property assessment agency. This residual
corresponds to the component of prices of the housing good attributable to local
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price levels (plus an idiosyncratic error) in that year. H(·) refers to a transfor-
mation (like an inverse normal transformation) which makes the expression into
a digestible parameter for the mixture model. There is no economic reason to
leave a neighborhood other than prices and a potential volatility in pull factors.
This latter factor may seem redundant with the fact that the pull factor latent
variable will shrink as pull factors like amenities and income are less readily
available, but as individuals often tend to anticipate such future shocks to an
economy, these terms allows speculative shocks to grip a neighborhood. Notice
that, much like in Athey et al. (2017b), most of these parameters can be learned
in a pooled fashion, so that observations across neighborhoods share statistical
power.
The pull factors of the economy are local income and amenities. By local
income, we mean the component of income which is determined by local employ-
ment access and access to vacancies. To determine this, we craft a new variable
ηj which defines local employment access. ηj may alternatively be seen as a
ratio between the current level of employment in the neighborhood versus full
employment. It is hard to measure, of course, but might be proxied by known
variables. Consider
Ȳjt = Yjt −
∑
j Yjt∑
j Njt
=: Yjt − Ỹjt (13)
The difference between the income distribution in a given neighborhood and
the distribution of the sample mean of the income distribution, across all sam-
pled neighborhoods. In an unbiased sample of neighborhoods, this difference is
the part of the local income distribution which deviates from simple expecta-
tions. Theoretically, this difference should be explained entirely by local spatial
effects and heterogeneity effects (composition). In other words, people in a
neighborhood with far higher income than the income of a city overall are ei-
ther more likely to have higher income or receive distinct advantages from the
neighborhood (more likely both). Further, such an income distribution in order
to remain high-income as people churn out must consistently have high-income
people - this is another way of saying there is low relative standard deviation in
incomes relative to the overall distribution of income in the sample. Estimate
these two effects as:
Ȳjt = ηjt + ω1
σj
σ
+ ω2
E(Yjt)
Ỹjt
+ ω3t (14)
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The above equation implies the relative standing of neighborhood j is a
function of the local employment access variable plus a function of its relative
variability (more variable neighborhoods will naturally possess higher means for
strictly positive income) and its relative mean income. The terms with coeffi-
cients ωk should capture the compositional effects, again pooling the ωk across
neighborhoods. This measure of ηj can be improved further in a broader struc-
tural model of the individual. One can imagine a duration dependent measure
of ηj that mirrors how skill loss is modeled by labor economists studying unem-
ployment. (Mueller et al., 2018) In particular, the longer an individual spends in
an area which appears to under-employ them, the more their skills deteriorate
and thus the stronger the impact on their income. This creates a mechanism
for hazard rates in poverty-trap regions.
Another way to express this would be that there are three components to
variations in sample means; compositional effects, heterogeneity effects, and
fixed effects. Compositional differences should be explained by the ratio of
means, while the degree of heterogeneity around compositional differences is
tested for by the first term. The fixed effect remains, which describes a neigh-
borhood’s inherent employment access level bonus. Higher access means lower
wage loss from travel time, lower chance of underemployment due to higher
access to a range of vacancies, and thus likely higher wages. Not every neigh-
borhood will have strong compositional effects or fixed effects, but most should
have one or the other.
Once we calculate ηj , the pull-side regression comes together cleanly.
βjt = H(bj + ζ1ηj + ζ2Ajt + ζ3Π
+
jt + δtt+ ε
(β)
jt ) (15)
The same definitions for individual components is used as above. The pos-
itive aspect of the price variable refers to market value based on a hedonic
valuation of assessed characteristics of the house (bedrooms, bathrooms, and
physical features). This represents the ”goods” being consumed when buying
housing in the area. Ajt refers to a measure of local amenity level. Like the lo-
cal employment component, this variable may require some clever measurement
techniques. Unlike ηj , however, this will be more rooted in the data available
than an econometric formulation.
One may ask how assignment to either estimator is chosen, as push factors
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should theoretically correspond to negative pull factors. Consider a subset of
neighborhoods with some fixed, equivalent αjt but different values of βjt. Then,
the true pull factors should account for the differences in βjt given the same αjt
across neighborhoods. In this way, the sufficient statistics become identifiable
quasi-experimental variation in one another. Then, there is a rejection standard
for these posterior models, as variables can be uncorrelated with their assigned
latent component once conditioning on co-requisite latent variables is taken into
account. Then, consider the following simple estimation technique:
1. Match neighborhoods into groups with similar values of αjt using a clus-
tering technique such as k-means or Principal Component Analysis.
2. Conduct the posterior analysis of βjt in these neighborhoods.
3. Repeat for clusters on βjt to obtain estimates for a posterior decomposition
of αjt.
This structural estimation procedure is in a sense a matching method which
ensures that neighborhoods only vary with regards to one parameter. We can
now estimate the elasticity of churn with respect to a particular neighborhood
attribute. Consider the quantity
εχit = 1/
card(N )∑
j=1
∂hj(t)
∂χ
(16)
where χ is some explanatory variable. Then, the elasticity is a distribution
measure.
∂hj(t)
∂χ
=
∑
i
∂θit
∂χ
(17)
P (
∂hj(t)
∂χ
) =
∂P (θit)
∂χ
(18)
It is considerably easier to estimate the logarithmic case of these derivatives,
e.g., to estimate the partial of the logarithm of the hazard rate, for reasons
which will be apparent below.
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∂ logP (hj(t))
∂χ
=
∂ logP (θit)
∂αjt
∂αjt
∂χ
+
∂ logP (θit)
∂βjt
∂βjt
∂χ
(19)
=
∂ logP (θit)
∂αjt
γχ +
∂ logP (θit)
∂βjt
ζχ (20)
=
∂L(Θjt)
∂αjt
γχ +
∂L(Θjt)
∂βjt
ζχ (21)
In other words, the elasticity of churn to a particular variable is the inner
product of the score of the log-likelihood on the parameter space Θjt and the
coefficients of that particular state variable in the model above. Note that the
log-likelihood of the beta-geometric setting is defined as
logL = L(Θjt) =
nj∑
i=1
logB(αjt + 1, xi + βjt)− nj logB(αjt, βjt) (22)
where nj is the population of the neighborhood under consideration. This
is a convenient characterization, as it means we can completely characterize
the structural response of a neighborhood to a particular shift in state variables
through the model above and the log-likelihood. In other words, we can derive a
secondary measure of demand sensitivity to a particular element of the ”basket
of goods” across a neighborhood based on churn data in this parametrization.
3.5 Inertia
Not every piece of the mobility equation is entirely measurable. Further, mo-
bility is not necessarily free. and this is often the critical failing of a simple
Tiebout process. Individuals may experience a hefty push factor from their cur-
rent neighborhood but be kept in place by insurmountable search costs. Others
may choose not to leave due to unique and un-measured community effects.
The above model should therefore consistently underestimate the push and pull
factors of the neighborhood using empirics - even highly specified empirics like
the local component of income discussion above. Then, I propose training a
second model with a specific inertia parameter.
A principled analysis of when the a posteriori break-down of Beta-Bernoulli
model results fails beyond omitted variables produces the following four expla-
nations:
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1. The individual believes they will not find a better option elsewhere.
2. Community effects significantly alter the economic decision to move.
3. Some nonstationary, exogenous force shocks the specification in a manner
that does not neatly fit one of the above parameters.
4. The individual cannot move due to other physical, legal, or un-captured
political reason.
On nonstationarity: in the current model, this nonstationarity would likely
be absorbed by a modeler ignorant of their source by the time fixed effects.
On beliefs: it’s possible individual beliefs are responsible for the remaining dis-
crepancy between model and fact. Perhaps a planning fallacy or present-biased
mentality causes discounting of the utility benefits provided by other neighbor-
hoods. This paper largely eschews a dynamical approach for a simpler analysis,
however, making beliefs estimation a subject for a later model.
Community effects are difficult to estimate in a truly quantitative manner. In
this setting, we can control for some degree of community effects by including
measures of racial evenness (the degree to which racial groups are evenly dis-
persed throughout a neighborhood of nearby census tracts) and income bracket
exposure (probability that individuals in different income brackets live in close
proximity, assuming a uniform meeting probability with everyone in the neigh-
borhood). Other sources of community, like a common ethnic identity or pres-
ence of strong institutions like a church or Catholic school, need to be assessed
case-by-case. I test some examples ex post.
Introduce, therefore, an inertia to the posterior analysis. A moving-out penalty
must be strong enough not just to drive the utility of moving to 0 (or even
crafting a disutility to moving out), and as a result the hazard rate should drop
to either 0 or an arbitrarily low hazard rate floor. The generating process is still
the same as above, but now we add this penalty fj :
h̃i(t) = f(θj |αjt, β̃jt) (23)
β̃jt = H(min{fj(bj + ζ1ηj + ζ2Ajt + ζ3Π+jt + δtt+ ε
(β)
jt ), bj}) (24)
Inertia is interpreted as a forced stay; it does not allow one to leave if the
pull factors fall below a neighborhood-specific critical threshold. Fixed effects
actively lower the push factor shadow price of staying in the neighborhood in the
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current period. For individuals whose income level is low enough that they are
likely to have high elasticities to changes in push factors, this term should have
a large effect size. A higher fixed cost can drive the parameter for action, this α
parameter, all the way down to the base case aj (meaning the minimum churn
parameter for this neighborhood - minimal movement out of the neighborhood
year over year).
This is an important deviation from the originating dynamics which pegged this
pull-side hazard parameter to the positive part of a utility function. Such a fixed
cost may enter as a lower income in a larger period-by-period income strategy
in a utility setting with full dynamics, but in a probabilistic setting considering
churn in period t, the fixed cost is presented each period (it is not sunk but an
active consideration in each period).
Once fj is estimated, we can compare it to other indicators of a neighborhood’s
health and determine whether it varies in relation to other economic phenomena
like neighborhood blight, credit tightness, or land use restrictions. This may
suggest policy avenues for addressing areas with particularly low mobility and
high inertia.
3.6 Dynamics
The current model does not allow for duration dependence or dynamics in the
hierarchical beta-binomial model. The key effect is due to composition, or
heterogeneity in the underlying population. Such a structure rules out the
possibility of dynamic, Markovian hazards. With more complete individual-
level data on movements, this dynamic setting would likely be more realistic
and more possible on the machine learning side. Dynamics can be investigated
in the posterior space, however.
4 Data
This project leverages publicly available data on Philadelphia’s neighborhoods.
Demographic and housing variables are derived from the American Community
Survey. Variables are available from 2010 to 2016 at the census tract level.
There are 384 census tracts in Philadelphia, with around 20 tracts having 0 or
negligible population in most years. This could be due to these tracts contained
large parks or transient populations, or simply due to accounting or measure-
ment conventions. There is a tradeoff to using publicly available ACS data. To
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get this level of granularity requires use of 5-year averages. This has the added
benefit of smoothing out nonstationarities and discontinuities in variables due to
uncaptured chance events. But, we lose information in the process of averaging.
Recognizing this, I still make the choice knowing that with fuller microdata the
analysis can be replicated with proper controls on chance nonstationarities. I
follow the lexical convention of allowing the 5-year average datapoint to rep-
resent the middle year of the average. For example, 2011-2015 represents the
2013 year.
Housing microdata samples are obtained using public records data from vari-
ous Philadelphia city departments. The official appraisals of a random sample
of homes across census tracts is afforded by the Philadelphia Office of Public
Assessment dating back to 1935, and up to the current year. These appraisals
include a model for a hedonic price and a breakdown of housing characteristics
including bedrooms, bathrooms, lot sizes, and other physical features. They
also include a sale price which represents the hedonic value plus value-add from
local amenities and other sources. The property assessment data includes group
quarters, apartments, and other rental properties.
The homeowner population in Philadelphia is static or decreasing as the
housing stock dates back in many regions of the city to the 1940s, making gen-
trification and disinvestment as forces primarily renter-focused. While income
of individuals in old housing stock is stable, shocks to homeownership tend to
imply large vacancies rather than gentrification. Many of these blighted neigh-
borhoods, with large vacant blocks (ex. West Kensington) have not since been
gentrified.
This data also provides features on housing characteristics (such as the num-
ber of bedrooms and other livability variables). Additionally, permitting and
zoning data for all of these neighborhoods are available as well, where new
construction permits are an important indicator of new development and gen-
trification.
Amenity-related data is also utilized. This data is drawn from the Google
Maps API and Google Places API.
As is conventional in the economics literature, gentrification is primarily de-
fined as a change in income. Figure (1) shows the distribution of changes in
mean neighborhood income over the sample period.
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Figure 1: Changes in neighborhood mean income over the sample period.
Survival rates for individuals of low, middle, and high income using the
income bracket cutoffs defined in ACS table B19001 are shown in Figure (2).
Figure 2: Histogram mapping survival rates by income bracket. (%)
Generally, the survival rates seem relatively homogeneous across the three
income brackets, without strong significant differences. However, this is aggre-
gated across neighborhoods. In specific neighborhoods, these numbers diverge
widely, suggesting that local heterogeneity drives survival but that overall local
heterogeneity is zero-sum - to be expected.
5 Calibration
The entire model is calibrated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. The
MCMC methodology was chosen over variational inference due to the use of
aggregation and a need for greater control over potential bias in the model (VI
tends to propagate bias in a manner that is more difficult to measure than
in Hamiltonian Monte Carlo). (Betancourt, 2017) First, I report estimation
of the key observables used in posterior analysis. Then, I report the machine
learning model results for beta-binomial latent parameters and posterior analysis
with observables. Finally, I report the results of an inertia-augmented posterior
results.
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5.1 Estimating Observables: Local Employment
Estimating observables of the model requires estimation of ηjt as in equation
(13). A plot of the empirical distribution of the known regressors is shown in
the figure.
Figure 3: Matrix plot of key regressions in (13). From top to bottom/right to
left: y-hat, relative income ratio, and log of the ratio of standard deviations.
The variables Ȳjt and ‘relinc’, which refers to Ỹjt are both somewhat remi-
niscent of a gamma distribution, with some evidence of hyperdispersion. Mean-
while, the logarithm of the standard deviation ratio in (13) - which is presented
in a logarithmic form to highlight some of the grain in the relationship - is most
informative at higher levels of the level of between-neighborhood heterogeneity,
with a significant amount of jitter around 0 (implying neighborhoods around
the mean have some fairly variable shapes). We can expect the model to have
some difficulty capturing this and experimented with binning the relative sigma
values to make the regression more informative.
Before directly producing the model described in (13), we fit a model without an
annualized ω3 and allow for a different year over year value of the coefficients ω1
and ω2. This determines whether the effect of time is a fixed one exogenous to
the given regressors or whether it is in fact a change in the regressor effect size.
The results of an MCMC run are shown in Figure (4), with average effective n
of about 1000. The figure presents a few important conclusions; we treat them
in kind. First, that the effect estimated mean of the relative sigma coefficient
is fairly strongly negative; in otherwise a higher relative variability indicates a
lower local income distribution mean overall. This seems to indicate variability
in this Philadelphia sample is biased more strongly left of the mean - which
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makes sense given Philadelphia has strongly spatially segregated poverty.
On a related note, then, is η tends to have a lower value - in other words,
local structural access is more likely to pose a disadvantage than an advantage.
This is a complex variable to decompose, and can range in interpretation from
travel time to access to government support services in finding new work.
Figure 4: MCMC run with time-based coefficients.
I compare these results to those where (13) is reproduced directly, shown
in Figure (5). The new model has a widely available information criterion
(WAIC) of 19629, compared to one of 19928 in the previous setting, indicating
a potentially better sampling of the posterior space of η. However, we also have
a higher standard error on the WAIC in this new model, which suggests the fit
is less consistently good throughout the sample.
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Figure 5: MCMC run with a separate time term.
In the new model, we see that the general distribution of ω1 and the terms
ηjt is fairly robust to the shift in model. ω2 is more cleanly positive, but has a
long left tail - incomes have a strong effect but interestingly there is probability
in the tails which indicates that in some neighborhoods the role of income vari-
ability or local effect may take over in explaining local spatial differences. The
graph also shows a series of normals which generally monotonically shift right
with time, as one may expect from a period of growth.
The mean ηjt are plotted against the tract-level mean churn times for middle
income individuals in Figure (6). The color-bar shows the value of Ŷjt in 2010.
Clearly, higher income neighborhoods have generally higher employment access.
Lower ηjt does not guarantee a lower level of Ŷjt, indicating that some of these
low-lying neighborhoods are likely income-variable. High churn rates tend to
happen in the neighborhoods without significant locational advantages or dis-
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advantages - closer to the mean. Why these churn rates don’t happen uniformly
given local income differentials and ηjt is the subject of our model, which studies
it in relation to estimated amenities and fixed costs of moving.
Figure 6: Scatterplot of local employment access ηj and the mean churn time
for middle income residents in a given neighborhood in 2010.
5.2 Estimating Observables: Local Amenities
The next step in model estimation is defining how we can measure or proxy local
amenities, Ajt. To do this, we draw on the Google Maps API and look at a
selected vector of possible key amenities for each home observed in the Property
Assessments database. Then, the distance and rating for each observed local
amenity are factored in to come up with a local amenity score. As the key
consideration in any amenity model tends to be the relative scoring, argue that
a sufficiently inclusive model which captures these relative effects should capture
this.
Amenity scoring can also have an affordability component; we can define this by
again using the Google Maps API and looking at features like local restaurants
and accessing price ratings of these features. By aggregating this information,
we can score affordability of amenities in addition to their core presence score
from above.
The amenities we look at are:
1. Parks and local green space.
2. Restaurants and cafés.
3. Grocery stores.
4. Corner stores and gas stations.
5. ”Things to do” including cinemas, bowling alleys, and other entertain-
ment/leisure venues.
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6. Local crime rates.
7. Ratings for local schools.
8. Vacancies, measures of local housing quality, and presence of dilapidated
housing.
In reality, a good amenity model will consider that individuals have poten-
tially income-specific preferences and utility for various neighborhood amenities.
We test the need for this in our model by allowing γ2 and Ajt in (15) to exist
as vectors. This allows variable estimation of relative utility. Note that a prin-
cipled derivation of the utility function of an individual in neighborhood j is
fully retrievable once these distributions are known, even in this hazard-based
setting. Then, the key determination for including a vector of weights for vari-
ous types of amenities is the numerical cleanliness of doing so.
We can craft a test to ensure our relative amenity weights are informative,
furthermore, by testing whether they can explain a spatial fixed effect differ-
ence in market value and sale price of a set of homes. Property assessment data
provides both of these factors. Market value in this dataset reflects a hedonic
value purely derived by a model based on observables such as lot size, number
of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, environmental hazards like asbestos, and
other physical factors conventionally used as controls. The sale price of a house
should be a function of this valuation, which acts as a sort of stationary an-
choring of the sale price. Sale prices then vary additionally according to local
amenity quality in a given year and the local community variables which are
unobserved. Then, a good measure of amenities should behave well in the linear
model:
Pijt = valijt + ~ω ~Ajt + µt + εijt (25)
Price of house i at time t in tract j has components equivalent to a hedonic
value plus amenities plus a time fixed effect (with idiosyncratic error). See Fig-
ure (7) for a clear linear relationship between value and sales price exhibited in
the Office of Property Assessment Data for 2010 through 2016. While property
assessment data has historically been biased, we rely on the simple hedonic def-
inition of value applied in the dataset here as a transparent and reliable one.
With this in mind, we see a case for (25).
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Figure 7: Simple bivariate linear case showing the logarithm of price plotted
against the logarithm of the OPA market value calculation.
We test to see whether the Google Maps information we collected fits this ex-
pectation in Figure (8). These results are generally indeed satisfying. Distances
which are significant indicate a growing distance from urban unfavorables (like
a gas station) may increase price, while favorables (like a train station) have
a large negative impact on prices. Higher rated amenities across the board
tend to have positive impacts on price, with groceries and gasoline access being
paramount to Philadelphia residents.
Figure 8: Robust linear model for sale price of a home based on its hedonic
value and various measures of amenities.
Of course, other specifications were tested. Importantly, one specification
which threw every variable which was not highly collinear with ‘value‘ in the
dataset into the modeler and allowed backwards selection of covariates was se-
lected; the final model was fairly parsimonious and smaller than the above, with
the only notable addition being mean travel time to work.
Other measures of amenities like distance to a central business district (CBD)
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or nearby commercial hub also have value; but by disaggregating specific ameni-
ties in this way, one can ensure that a sufficient amount of heterogeneity of pref-
erences is being exhibited to capture a larger variety of neighborhood demand.
Because this work is particularly aiming to analyze blighted neighborhoods, as-
suming access to known commercial corridors or the CBD should be the main
amenity considered by those still in the neighborhood is likely flawed; it’s merely
one piece of a true internal calculus. We include CBD via the “office dist” vari-
able in the regression - one can see it is not particularly robust in the face of
the other regressors.
5.3 Beta-Binomial and Posterior Analysis
With all observables ready to use, I run the beta-binomial learning algorithm
and run the described posterior analysis using observable variables. The co-
efficient posterior distributions are reported in Appendix B. These coefficients
represent a measure of the elasticity of the likelihood of moving out to a positive
change in the variable in question. Most of these sensitivities are significant.
Before continuing with posterior analysis, I briefly discuss the results of the
beta-binomial fit. The distribution in 2016 in tract 157 of the latent parameters
of the beta is shown in Figure (9). Clearly, this tract has a strong bias towards
churning out of the tract. Note that while the horizontal axis is all negative,
this does not translate directly to Uijt being negative for all individuals; this
analysis requires drawing a parameter θit from the distribution.
Figure 9: Horizontal variation is variation in βjt − αjt, vertical represents vari-
ation in βjt + αjt. Joint distribution of βjt and αjt in tract 157 in 2016.
I also map the pull factors of each neighborhood at the end of the observed
period over a map of Philadelphia. The distribution is mapped in Figure (10).
The maps shows a few expected trends. For example, high pull-factor areas
include key commercial corridors like South Philadelphia and the Central Busi-
ness District as well as wealthier districts on the outskirts of the city. Areas
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Figure 10: Map demonstrating values of the latent employment variable across
Philadelphia census tracts.
(a) Histogram counting number of tract-
year paired observations (e.g. an observa-
tion is tract j in year t) with specified pop-
ulation out-migrating.
(b) Retention rates (e.g., proportion of
population which survived) histogram with
observations corresponding to tract-year.
Figure 11: Model calibration results.
with persistent poverty issues, Oxford and 12th for example, are not as strong
on pull factor. Newly gentrified Fishtown shows a very strong pull factor. This
correspondence with fact is encouraging.
Returning to posterior analysis, more important than the estimated coefficients
would be the reported fit. We analyze the fit using two histograms; the first,
the histogram for raw number of individuals churned by neighborhood. The
second, the histogram of retention rates by neighborhood ( 1nj
∑nj
i=1(1 − θi)).
The first histogram, (11a), appears near perfect; there is a slight overestima-
tion of the lowest two bins (this could be due to the need for a “zero-inflated”
setting which captures the probability of a tract with 0 population, e.g., the
probability of a measurement error). The second, (11b), tells a more nuanced
story. The posterior semi-linear model dramatically underestimates very high
retention rates.
To test whether the underprediction is the result of measurement error (0-
population tracts) skewing the model prediction, we also test a zero-inflated
model that explicitly assigns a non-zero probability to measurement errors in the
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(a) Zero-inflated model performance on
out-migration numbers.
(b) Zero-inflated model performance on
non-zero tract retention.
Figure 12: Zero-inflated calibration results.
ACS. In practice, this means a a Bernoulli trial whose success event corresponds
to the population of a tract being 0 is assigned for each neighborhood before the
posterior model is run. With this new setting, we replicate the figures above on
the datapoints which do not default to 0 (e.g., the subset of tract observations
where Nj > 0).
Figure (12) clearly demonstrates that there is still significant under-prediction
of neighborhoods with low out-migration and overprediction of high out-migration.
We now investigate whether an inertia can resolve this contention.
5.4 Inertia Posterior Analysis
This model takes the extended equation (23) and implements it. The prior on
inertia is a positive half-normal that spikes at 1 (because an inertia of 1 means
the original specification is valid). If the posterior analysis is correct, the effect
of including fj on shape of the existing retention rate of neighborhoods should
have either minimal or a slightly positive impact, raising the number of people
predicted to stay. Potentially fj should vary significantly with key covariates
of the costs of mobility, such as local renter proportions, mortgage rates, house
prices, and even local income effects measured by ηj . We test both of these as
possible posterior predictive checks in addition to the usual histogram compar-
isons. Critically, note that inertia should primarily effect churn in neighborhoods
with a sizable low income population as these are neighborhoods with a likely
lower elasticity to changes in local amenities and other pull factors.
If mortgage and renter variables do not bear a critical effect on the inertia, yet
fj tends to be nonzero across neighborhoods, we argue that low-income commu-
nity effects are the likely driver (see Section 3.5). In other words, a non-fiscal
mobility inertia exists in this case.
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(a) Raw population churned across all ob-
servations from model and observation.
(b) Retention rates across all observations
from model and observation.
Figure 13: Model calibration results.
The posterior predictive histograms are shown in Figure (13). Clearly, the fit
has resolved the issue of underpredicting low-churn tracts (in fact, there is a
slight overprediction), and is nearly perfect across all bins of both the churn
and retention histograms in a visual test. While a priori, the model was going
to be tested with a zero-inflated fit, these results indicate such an approach
might be mis-specified. Zero-population tracts were dropped. The new model’s
WAIC has improved approximately 3-fold from 314,352 to 115,585.
The distribution of the inertia, which recall is essentially a proportion of
β̃jt, is illustrated in the figure (14). The value, ‘pf‘ (for “proportion f”) exhibits
bimodal behavior, with a smaller concentration of tracts having high (near-
zero) inertia and a large section of tracts concentrated around the mean at
33% of the pull factor latent variable. Considering that Philadelphia is indeed
the country’s largest poor city, this first mode makes sense. The tail seems to
indicate the richest neighborhoods which have little restriction to mobility and
highly non-local communities.s
Figure 14: The estimated posterior distribution of the inertia term.
Now we test whether this estimator indeed can be explained as a inertia
estimator. First, we look at the conditional distributions of inertia with respect
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to the price level of a neighborhood by comparing its distributions in census
tracts in the top and bottom quartiles of local house prices.
(a) Inertia estimator in neighborhoods in
the bottom quartile for home prices.
(b) Inertia estimator in neighborhoods in
the top quartile for home prices.
Figure 15: Conditional distribution of fixed costs given local home prices.
Figure (15) does precisely this. Notice that in the higher income tracts, a
second mode emerges above 0.5, suggesting highly mobile neighborhoods are
more common in the high-price set. is being contributed by high-price neigh-
borhoods.
Then, wealthier neighborhoods with higher local prices exhibit a tendency to-
wards mobility based on the variable ‘f’ alone. This is suggestive that inertia also
contains an income-specific fixed cost effect. With this correlation-based analy-
sis, the hypothesis is now tested by using a suggestive linear model. Fixed costs
should be a deterministic function of whether individual residents are home-
owners, homeowners’ mortgage paperwork, job search time. Job search time is
generally a function of job finding likelihood (said at risk of upsetting the labor
literature - this statement is of course a simplification of a complex search-and-
matching process). The local job market’s relative value, η will serve as proxy
for an individual’s likelihood of finding a future job. The two are fundamentally
linked values, where job-finding likelihoods are both in reality and perceptions
set according to localized job market accessibility, as argued by (Ioannides and
Datcher Loury, 2004) and (Van der Klaauw and Van Ours, 2003). With this
set of covariates, the following linear model is formed:
fj = β0 + β1mean mortgage ratejt + β2ηj + ut + εjt (26)
Some conclusions from the model are worth highlighting. First, higher rate
of mortgage coincides with higher local inertia. Rentership coincides with lower
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inertia. Higher local employment opportunity and inertia are somewhat corre-
lated, suggesting more predictably mobile neighborhoods have more opportuni-
ties as well. All of these values are significant in the measurement of fj , even
when robust standard errors with local- and time- fixed effects are used.
Variable Estimator p-value
rentership 0.118 0.009
mortgage -0.245 0.001
ηj 0.001 0.065
Table 1: Results of the regression in (26).
This analysis indicates that a source of local retention dynamics is that geo-
graphic mobility is significantly hampered by the fixed cost of leaving. Further,
these fixed costs are tied up with low-income neighborhoods. Neighborhoods
with lower local employment access, be it due to distance or other factors (mea-
sured by ηj) are persistently likely to also face large barriers to out-migration
(see Table 2).
Variable Estimator p-value
{fj |ηj < Q
ηj
1 } - {fj |ηj > Q
ηj
3 } 1.845 0.07
Table 2: Normalized and dimensionless test statistic comparing inertia in lowest
and highest quartiles of local employment mobility based on estimated posterior.
What about the community effect? As the title of this dissertation suggests,
there is no degree of certainty that the unexplained pull factor represented by
inertia is a financial issue. However, a measure of community is beyond the scope
of this paper. Sufficient for this analysis is to demonstrate the correlation of this
inertia measure with the presence of key institutions which form communities.
Take, for example, charter schools for elementary-aged children. Such schools
can develop strong connections between parents and, for young families, these
connections provide an amenity that very few economic measures can accurately
capture. I explore this experiment here. In figure (16), I map the locations of
Philadelphia charter schools.
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(a) Locations of elementary charter schools
around the City of Philadelphia. Colors
correspond to rating by parents combined
with test scores. Courtesy of GreatSchools
API.
(b) Charter schools with a buffer of 0.01
miles, overlaid with inertia estimates by
census tract.
Figure 16: Posterior analysis of how inertia can capture community effects by
focusing on charter elementary schools.
The mapping makes it rather clear that charter schools generally tend to be
in areas where pull factors are being underestimated. People want to stay in
areas with charter schools, and this is not something that is originally in our
posterior analysis. The hypothesis that proximity to charter elementary schools
have a significant effect on local inertia has a t-statistic of 2.983 resulting in a
significance at the 98th percentile. There are some concerns with this analysis at
first pass, not least of which that proximity to charter schools tend to correlate
with areas of high income. I plot the distribution of income by group in (17). In
fact, in Philadelphia, it appears that a majority of the areas with charter schools
tend to have an average median income. Few low-income tracts have charter
schools. Focusing just on the middle-income charter schools and creating an
income cutoff at $80,000, however, increases the significance of the t-test rather
than diluting it. This seems to indicate that the income effect alone is not
responsible for generating the pattern these rudimentary comparative statistics
suggests.
6 Discussion
The figure (18) maps out the distribution of f around Philadelphia. Notice that
mobility traps tend to coincide heavily with areas with limited income. Key spa-
tial behaviors are confirmed; for example, inertia tends to grow as distance from
key commercial centers like center city Philadelphia increases. Neighborhoods
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Figure 17: Histogram of tract mean income in thousands of dollars by presence
of a charter school (0 = no school in the tract).
with the highest inertia are those one may expect; Kingsessing, West Kensing-
ton, Germantown, and Juniata Park, Eastwick, and Roxborough. Manayunk
poses an interesting case to one versed in Philadelphia consumption patterns, as
it is present as a potential mobility trap despite potentially high income shop-
pers spending time in the area. It is middling on access to employment. Perhaps
this is explained by a large amount of economic vitality being rooted in a few
small businesses along the main streets of Manayunk, surrounded by an older
mill town. Most of these neighborhoods have been characterized as blighted or
low-income. Center city and cultural centers like South Philadelphia tend to
have higher fixed costs combined with higher employment access, which could
be explained by community resettlement costs.
Figure 18: Map demonstrating values of the intertia to mobility variable across
Philadelphia census tracts.
I argue that generally speaking, the inertia measure seems to include both
noneconomic forces and economic forces. The noneconomic piece I interpret as
being in line with non-measurable social structures and community effects. Such
inertia relates to a loss of local competitive advantages accrued through cultural
or economic agglomeration benefits if a resident were to leave - rather than pure
payments alone. These are still relevant considerations in the latent variable,
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and can be estimated by the residual values from the regression in Table (1).
Next, I consider a direct comparison of neighborhoods which have undergone
revitalization before the sample period and those which are marked as suffering
from neighborhood blight at any point in the period. I focus on neighborhoods
which have undergone revitalization to emphasize that the neighborhoods all
have some history of being assessed as poverty traps, but certain neighborhoods
are selected as treated areas by Philadelphia planning revitalization at a given
time. Identification is threatened due to racial politics of blight having changed
over the course of the last 30 years, so I only compare neighborhoods labeled
after 1995. Looking at estimated fixed costs at the end of the analysis window
in 2016 in Table 3, the differences are clear.
Revitalized Neighborhoods 0.623755
Neighborhoods Certified Blighted 0.546623
T-test Statistic 5.011
Table 3: Comparison of blighted neighborhood fixed costs before and after
revitalization by Philadelphia Planning.
Areas with the highest inertia included 2nd & Oxford, the naval base (which,
since 2016, has been rapidly redeveloping), and East Overbrook. These areas
have radically high inertia. The comparison fixed effect cannot be ascribed di-
rectly to a change in mobility costs or a change in community quality, however,
which poses a threat to identification of either effect. In particular, it is pos-
sible that both are responsible and the revitalized neighborhoods are actually
very much suffering from lower rates of local community formation rather than
an easier fluidity of leaving the neighborhood. However, considering some of
these revitalized neighborhoods - Fishtown and Center City, for example - the
community effects are likely what have inflated the inertia estimator. A sig-
nificant consideration is the potential missing variables problem. If there is a
force that is not present in this model, outside of prices, aggregated amenities,
fixed costs, housing components, and employment access, then it may diminish
the purported influence of fixed costs or alter measurement tactics of local em-
ployment access.
The implications of this study are in many ways a measurement claim, where
the construction process for inertia was an important exercise. Using a Bayesian
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latent variable construction to measure what econometricians usually assign to
fixed effects allows parsing where the conventional econometric measurement
paradigm fails for the low-income individual. It also provides a clear estimation
avenue for community, indirect, and noneconomic effect size on fundamental
economic processes. These are the key results of the paper aside from the impli-
cation about the role of fixed effects in creating mobility patterns in low-income
neighborhoods.
7 Conclusion
The rate of movement into neighborhoods has been studied in critical applica-
tions surrounding gentrification, neighborhood decline, and place-based policy.
Understanding measures of stability and who leaves the neighborhood, however,
is a critical method for understanding who bears the cost of changing neighbor-
hood landscapes. This work attempts to develop replicable methodologies for
studying neighborhood out-migration as a means to studying geographic mo-
bility. In doing so, we find that using the geographic concepts of push and pull
factors to describe amenities with disamenity and amenity value, respectively,
is useful for developing a cohesive model with full specification of elasticities.
The model suggests that the variables used in a vast majority of papers on
neighborhood choice do not necessarily explain the entirety of the calculus of
leaving a neighborhood. In fact, the “usual culprits” overpredict out-migration
and therefore either underpredict the relative “pull factors” or overpredict “push
factors” of the neighborhood. In some neighborhoods around the test case of
Philadelphia, the severity of this prediction error is upwards of 60%. I refer to
this prediction error as residential inertia.
Two sources of potentially un-measured variation in the model come from
variable credit availability across neighborhoods and varying community strength
across the same. I test both of these after extracting a cleaned measure of res-
idential inertia. I find that both explanations hold water, both by testing a
regression of financial variables on neighborhood inertia (which led to an R2 of
35%) and by looking at income-controlled comparisons between neighborhoods
with and without anchoring institutions like charter elementary schools.
If nothing else, this work becomes a useful exercise in using a simple hier-
archical Bayesian data generating process to develop measures for unexplained
variation. This method has its risks, but the use of histogram-based migration
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data curtails some concerns about overfitting individual-level behavior. The
model presents some useful conclusions about developing an economic version
of a push-pull framework while also presenting a unique way to see how neolib-
eral models of neighborhood choice still have work to do to prove an empiricist’s
case.
Further, this paper’s results opens the door to a more dynamic model which
considers potential duration dependence effects on individuals who do not leave
when their locally-derived utility falls below a competitive rate. These individ-
uals may then face deterioration of property values in the long term which could
lead to the larger poverty trap cycle. Such a dynamic setting was left for future
work due to limitations of the publicly available data used.
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A Events Controls
Event Significant at 95%
Passage of 2015 Lower Court Ruling preventing
City from forcing developers
to maintain vacant buildings
No
Recession 2009-2011 Yes
B Coefficients in Churn Model, No Fixed Costs
Variable αjt Estimator βjt Estimator Significance at 95%
Distance, Groceries 0.534 Y
Distance, Gasoline -0.044 Y
Distance, Bank Branch 0.362 Y
Distance, Nightlife and Entertainment 0.029 Y
Train accessibility 1.228 Y
Bus accessibility 0.805 Y
Ratings for Local Groceries 0.077 N
Ratings for Local Entertainment 0.039 Y
Local school ratings (Google) 0.199 Y
Local crime rates 0.138 Y
Local Income Variability 0.185 Y
Racial evenness estimator 0.090 N
Income exposure index 0.068 Y
ηjt 0.225 Y
Housing price-market value residual 0.740 Y
Housing hedonic value 0.165 N
Event fixed effect 0.050 0.023 N
Vacant lot evenness 0.552 Y
Commercial plate evenness 0.007 0.035 N
Vehicle ownership 0.100 Y
Table 4: Results of beta-geometric regression without a fixed cost estimator.
Neither was significant, though the estimated effect size in the pull estimator
was stronger (at a similar significance level of about p < 0.25).
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